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PUTTING MELENDEZ-DIAZ ON ICE:  HOW 
AUTOPSY REPORTS CAN SURVIVE THE 
SUPREME COURT’S CONFRONTATION 
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
GEORGE M. TSIATIS†






Were the Medical Examiners (“MEs”) of the United States 
like Dr. House on a Tuesday,2
 
† Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review, J.D. Candidate, 2011, St. John’s 
University School of Law; A.B., Special Concentration in Byzantine Studies, 2004, 
Harvard University. Special thanks to Professor Scott E. Kessler, to my brother, 
Athanasios, and to Megan each of whom was very generous in sharing his or her 
respective expertise, and, without whom I could have never understood the 
important practical implications of this issue. Many thanks, as always, to my 
parents, to Maria, to Megan (again) and to Christian for their extraordinary 
patience, understanding and support. 
 we would have many things to be 
1 This popular slogan that adorns morgues around the world, see, e.g., Margaret 
Graham, Morgue 2 (photograph), FLICKR (Apr. 10, 2006), http:// 
www.flickr.com/photos/drexelmedarchives/3404963652/ (belonging to DrexelMed 
Archives’ Photostream), roughly translates from Latin to English as, “Let 
conversations be silenced. Let laughter take flight. This is the place where death 
takes joy in helping the living.” Id. (author’s translation). The National Association 
of Medical Examiners uses the last sentence as its subtitle on its website, see NAT’L 
ASS’N OF MED. EXAM’RS, http://thename.org/ (last updated Mar. 2, 2011), but the 
entire quote is used more often, see, e.g., Thomas A. Godwin, End of Life: Natural or 
Unnatural Death Investigation and Certification, 51 DISEASE-A-MONTH 218, 219 
(2005). 
2 Based on the following exchange between the popular television 
characters of Dr. Gregory House and Dr. Lisa Cuddy in the episode titled 
“Autopsy”: 
Dr. Gregory House: Is it still illegal to perform an autopsy on a living 
person?  
Dr. Lisa Cuddy: Are you high? 
Dr. Gregory House: If it’s Tuesday, I’m wasted. 
Dr. Lisa Cuddy: It’s Wednesday. 
Memorable Quotes for “House M.D.” Autopsy (2005), THE INTERNET MOVIE 
DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0606012/quotes (last visited Apr. 3, 2011) 
(quoting House: Autopsy, (FOX television broadcast Oct. 7, 2005)). This serves to 
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concerned with, including their state of mind and adherence to 
procedure.  As a group of professionals, though, MEs are 
organized3 and have produced training, educational, and 
examination standards.4  They have also produced performance 
standards outlining and defining the many important tasks they 
perform, especially forensic autopsies.5
Like other professionals, though, many MEs move, change 
jobs, and change careers; like all people, they also die.  A criminal 
investigation, the filing of charges and a trial can take months, 
even years, exponentially increasing the likelihood that the ME 
on a case will be unavailable to testify or will have had a 
significant change in circumstances.
  They are a highly trained 
subset of the population that performs the difficult but fulfilling 
task of providing an individual’s final medical examination so 
that his or her survivors can have the closure that comes with 
learning, to the degree that medical certainty permits, how their 
relative, loved one, or colleague came to pass.  When the death 
leads to the filing of criminal charges, MEs will often testify to 
their findings and share parts of their reports for the prosecution. 
6
 
highlight the overexaggerated fictionalization of physicians and law enforcement 
agents our society has become acquainted with through television programs like 
House, CSI, Bones, and NCIS. The characters are presented in a way that drives 
drama and plot development, not in a way that presents the realities of medical and 
forensic work. 
  The current legal 
landscape creates a zone of uncertainty for how the autopsy 
reports that MEs produce can be used in criminal trials at which 
they cannot be present, for any of the aforementioned ordinary 
occurrences in people’s lives.  The Supreme Court’s Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence, culminating in the recent decision of 
3 See General Information, NAT’L ASS’N OF MED. EXAM’RS (Jan. 15, 2011), 
http://thename.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=46&Itemid=29.  
4 For requirements to become board certified in both a primary specialty and a 
subspecialty see AM. BD. OF PATHOLOGY, BOOKLET OF INFORMATION 2011, 3–12, 
available at http://www.abpath.org/2011BookletofInformation.pdf. The requirements 
to become a board-certified forensic pathologist specifically include “[One] full year 
of additional training in forensic pathology in a program accredited for such training 
by the [Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education].” Id. at 7. 
5 See generally GARRY F. PETERSON & STEVEN C. CLARK, NAT’L ASS’N OF MED. 
EXAM’RS, FORENSIC AUTOPSY PERFORMANCE STANDARDS (2006), available at 
http://thename.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=18&Ite
mid=26. 
6 This Note uses the term “unavailable” in the general sense and not in 
reference to the “unavailability” that the Federal Rules of Evidence require for 
certain hearsay exceptions. See FED. R. EVID. 804 (definitions of unavailability and 
hearsay exceptions requiring that the declarant is unavailable).  
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Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,7 has pressed a more exacting 
lens on such a situation by analyzing the constitutionality of 
admitting forensic evidence in the absence of the analyst who 
prepared the report.8  While there is significant uncertainty 
about whether or not this applies to autopsy reports and about 
how to handle forensic evidence, with minor adjustments either 
by the MEs or by the courts, the majority of any autopsy report 
should be admissible without the testimony of the pathologist 
who performed the autopsy.  Ideally, the ME would be present to 
testify, but in the event that he or she is unavailable—through 
change of job, relocation, sickness, or death—large portions of the 
report should still survive admission, because they fall outside 
the Court’s definition of the “core class of testimonial 
statements,”9 and, if a court does not agree, it can always redact 
portions from the report to remove any “testimonial” 
characteristics.10
This Note examines how the Supreme Court’s holding in the 
Melendez-Diaz case has impacted autopsy reports as evidentiary 
tools in criminal cases.  Part I offers some background on autopsy 
reports and forensic pathology, discusses key evidentiary rules, 
and the history of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause 
leading up to Melendez-Diaz.  Part II explores the breadth and 
consequences of Melendez-Diaz, particularly as they impact 
autopsy reports.  Part III analyzes how autopsy reports differ 
fundamentally from many other types of forensic reports, notably 
because of policy issues they implicate.  Finally, Part IV defines 
and presents the “lean rule” as an alternative for MEs and courts 
 
 
7 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). The Supreme Court has signaled that Melendez-Diaz is 
here to stay by granting certiorari to a Confrontation Clause case only one term 
after it decided Melendez-Diaz, vacated the judgment of the Virginia high court in 
that case and remanded it “for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion 
in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.” Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316, 1316 
(2010). 
8 To the author, this issue initially appeared to be hypothetical, but I attended a 
homicide trial in the course of my research and heard one City ME testify on behalf 
of a Fellow, who, after her year at the program elapsed, moved out of state to become 
an ME in another jurisdiction. Given the requirement of one year of “additional 
training,” this issue would seem to arise regularly. See supra note 4. This only 
heightens the importance of finding a solution that addresses the evidentiary, 
constitutional, and practical issues at play. 
9 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532.  
10 See People v. Freycinet, 11 N.Y.3d 38, 42, 892 N.E.2d 843, 846, 862 N.Y.S.2d 
450, 453 (2008) (holding an autopsy report with opinions redacted was not 
testimonial). 
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alike that does not implicate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
interests, that provides the prosecution with facts and 
observations that can still be used should the particular ME be 
unavailable, and that allows MEs to continue performing their 
duties in a relatively uninterrupted fashion. 
The interests at play here are fundamental to the 
preservation of constitutional liberties on the one hand, and to 
our system of justice, our understanding of the world, and our 
very humanity on the other hand.  In crafting a solution, due 
consideration must be paid to both sides.  Constitutional liberties 
necessarily run up against the interests of the State.11  But those 
liberties were derived from an order of natural law,12
I. EXAMINING THE USE OF AUTOPSY REPORTS IN CRIMINAL 
CASES 
 which, in 
the case of an autopsy report, runs them up against individuals, 
that is, the families and loved ones of the deceased, who hope for 
the peace and closure of a final pronouncement on the matter.  
This tension—weighing the interests of individuals against one 
another rather than the individual’s interest against that of the 
State—upends standard constitutional analysis and demands 
bespoke treatment.  While this tension is not an issue for many 
outputs of forensic analysis, autopsy reports inhabit a liminal 
locus, between life and death, between science and art, and in 
that place, they require understanding and consideration as 
forensic reports, as public records, as evidence, and as the final 
punctuation on a person’s life. 
An autopsy report and the testimony of the ME can serve as 
evidence for some of the more obvious parts of the prosecution’s 
case, but because of the burden the prosecution must bear, the 
evidence that the report and the ME can provide for those 
elements is crucial.  While MEs generally cannot speak to the 
mens rea, actus reus, or concurrence,13
 
11 See David Lombard Harrison, The USA Patriot Act: A New Way of Thinking, 
An Old Way of Reacting, Higher Education Responds, 5 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 177, 179 
(2004). 
 they can generally offer 
evidence of causation—that the actus reus lead to the decedent’s 
12 See Geoffrey R. Stone, The World of the Framers: A Christian Nation?, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 1, 8 n.46 (2008). 
13 This is qualified because it is possible that, outside of their capacity as MEs, 
they might witness the actual crime or have a relationship with the defendant that 
allows them to speak to her intent. 
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death—and of the ultimate harm—that the deceased is, in fact, 
deceased.14  Taking the example of a basic shooting:  The ME 
would not likely testify as to whether the defendant shot the 
decedent, whether the defendant intended to harm the decedent, 
or whether the defendant actually intended to shoot the 
decedent.  The ME would likely testify to the fact that a bullet 
caused the trauma that led to the death of the decedent and that 
the decedent was dead.  These seem to be obvious findings that 
any reasonable person could come to, but when the hypothetical 
becomes more complex and the decedent is in very frail health, 
falls down the stairs, hits his head, has a heart attack, and is 
shot by three shooters in different parts of his body, the entire 
case may hinge on the findings of the ME as to the paths of the 
various bullets and what actually brought his life to an end.15
A. Anatomy of an Autopsy Report  
  To 
better frame the important role that autopsy reports play, this 
section will explore the make-up of an autopsy report, the 
Federal Rules of Evidence as they apply to the characteristics of 
an autopsy report, and the history of the Supreme Court’s 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. 
The National Association of Medical Examiners defines an 
autopsy as “[a]n examination and dissection of a dead body by a 
physician for the purpose of determining the cause, mechanism, 
or manner of death, or the seat of disease, confirming the clinical 
diagnosis, obtaining specimens for specialized testing, retrieving 
physical evidence, identifying the deceased or educating medical 
 
14 For a review of the elements of a crime, see generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, 
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW §§ 9, 10, 14, 15 (5th ed. 2009). A death certificate 
can also serve as evidence of the decedent’s demise, see DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, MEDICAL EXAMINERS’ AND CORONERS’ 
HANDBOOK ON DEATH REGISTRATION & FETAL DEATH REPORTING 2 (2003) 
[hereinafter MED. EXAM’RS’ & CORONERS’ HANDBOOK], available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/misc/hb_me.pdf (“[I]nformation in the record is 
considered as prima facie evidence of the fact of death . . . .”), but the information on 
it is derived from the same source as the autopsy report and exists in a less 
contextual format, so it should be subject to the same criticisms and the same 
protections as the autopsy report.    
15 For a less complex, but equally demonstrative, situation, see Katie Zezima, 
Death of Father of Ice Skater Is a Homicide, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, at A18 
(explaining the ME’s ruling of a homicide, despite his finding of a pre-existing 
cardiac condition, which the family blames for his death). 
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professionals and students.”16  MEs approach their 
responsibilities at two levels: the jurisdictional question of 
whether they should investigate the death further, and the 
operational question of whether an autopsy ought to be 
performed.  Investigations should be initiated in all cases where 
jurisdiction is granted “by statutes, rules, and regulations,” and 
in cases “[that] should receive further investigations to protect 
the public safety and health.”17  Forensic autopsies ought to be 
performed for any of a dozen reasons, including if “the death is 
known or suspected to have been caused by apparent criminal 
violence . . . [, and] the body is unidentified and the autopsy may 
aid in identification.”18  In these situations, “the public interest is 
so compelling that one must always assume that questions will 
arise that require information obtainable only by forensic 
autopsy.”19
For the purposes of this Note, several portions of an autopsy 
report are of particular interest: the identification of the 
deceased, the cause of death, the manner of death, and the 
addenda that often accompany the report—usually in the form of 




16 PETERSON & CLARK, supra note 5, at 19. 
  While 
these merit additional consideration, it is important to note that 
the rest of the report is filled with background information like 
the time, date, and location of the autopsy, along with any 
medical history that can be compiled, and numerous descriptions, 
17 Id. at 2 (enumerating eight particular scenarios that require further 
investigation: “deaths due to violence[,] . . . known or suspected non-natural 
deaths[,] . . . unexpected or unexplained deaths when in apparent good 
health[,] . . . unexpected or unexplained deaths of infants and children[,] . . . deaths 
occurring under unusual or suspicious circumstances[,] . . . deaths of persons in 
custody[,] . . . deaths known or suspected to be caused by diseases constituting a 
threat to public health[,] . . . deaths of persons not under the care of a physician”). 
18 Id. at 3–4 (noting that the other ten reasons are: “the death is unexpected and 
unexplained in an infant or child[,] . . . the death is associated with police 
action[,] . . . the death is apparently nonnatural and in custody of a local, state, or 
federal institution[,] . . . the death is due to acute workplace injury[,] . . . the death is 
caused by apparent electrocution[,] . . . the death is by apparent intoxication by 
alcohol, drugs, or poison[,] . . . the death is caused by unwitnessed or suspected 
drowning[,] . . . the body is skeletonized[,] . . . the body is charred[,] . . . the forensic 
pathologist deems a forensic autopsy is necessary to determine cause or manner of 
death or collect evidence”). 
19 Id. at 3. 
20 For a complete list of the content and format of an autopsy report see id. at 
18. 
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interpretations, and opinions qualified as necessary.21  The 
discussion of these more basic pieces is limited because they are 
the building blocks that lead to the report’s conclusions.  The 
conclusions are what make autopsy reports so vital to families, to 
the public, and to prosecutors.  The cause of death and manner of 
death are generally included on death certificates,22 and are used 
as the basis for statistical reporting.23  These rulings can impact 
insurance claims, settlement of the estate, and closure for the 
family of the decedent.24
Identification of the body is often achieved by a visual 
identification or by a comparison of dental records, fingerprints, 
X-rays, or DNA.
  The rulings are a significant purpose of 
the autopsy, but their use in a criminal trial, at which the ME 
who performed the autopsy is not present, is questionable under 
the latest interpretation of the Confrontation Clause to come 
down from the Court.  Therefore, a sound understanding of each 
element of an autopsy report is necessary to explore how it may 
fit into the Court’s current regime. 
25  Throughout their examinations, MEs remain 
attentive to features, such as tattoos and scars, that can help 
confirm the identity of the deceased, even if there is a 
presumptive or visual identification.26  MEs must also carefully 
preserve the evidence through photographs, X-rays,27 and 
documentation of the deceased’s “clothing and personal effects,” 
all with the purpose of avoiding exhumation if the identification 
is challenged.28
 
21 See id.  
  The thoroughness of this identification process, 
which applies with equal force to individuals found with their 
driver’s licenses and to those found only as skeletal fragments in 
a swamp, ensures that presumptions are kept to a minimum.  
22 See NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. STANDARD CERTIFICATE OF 
DEATH (1989), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/std-dcrt.pdf. 
23 See MED. EXAM’RS’ & CORONERS’ HANDBOOK, supra note 14. Statistical 
reporting, besides providing a measurement of recent trends, “is used to determine 
which medical conditions receive research and development funding, to set public 
health goals, and to measure health status at local, State, national, and 
international levels.” Id.  
24 See id. at 2, 24. 
25 See PETERSON & CLARK, supra note 5, at 5. 
26 See id. at 8. 
27 See id. at 5–6. X-rays are important to “document skeletal characteristics and 
radio-opaque foreign bodies such as bullets, pacemakers, and artificial joints.” Id. at 
6. 
28 Id. at 6. 
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While MEs will generally not expend efforts beyond what seems 
necessary to arrive at the conclusion, they will retain and 
document the evidence in their report that will allow them—or 
another party—to corroborate their conclusion should it be called 
into question after the body proceeds to its final resting place.29
Cause of death and manner of death are distinct conclusions 
that serve different purposes.  Cause of death is “[t]he underlying 
disease or injury responsible for setting in motion a series of 
physiologic events culminating in death,”
 
30 for example, “cardiac 
arrest due to coronary artery atherosclerosis.”31  Cause of death 
outlines a detailed mechanism and sequence by which the death 
occurred.  Manner of death, on the other hand, is designed to 
simplify the result, “classifying deaths based in large part on the 
presence or absence of intent to harm, and the presence or 
absence of violence, the purpose of which is to guide vital 
statistics nosologists to the correct external causation code in the 
International Classification of Diseases.”32  In contrast to cause of 
death, which covers expansive areas of medical science and has 
numerous permutations of sequence, the options for manner of 
death are limited to “natural, accident, homicide, suicide, 
undetermined, and in some registration districts for vital 
statistics, unclassified.”33
 
29 See id. at 5–6 (“Careful preservation and archiving provide an objective basis 
for future identification and thereby avoid the need for exhumation.”). 
  Again, the details discovered through 
the autopsy and catalogued in significant detail throughout the 
report culminate in these two findings, with the goal of capturing 
in a summary what category the death falls into and the steps 
through which it occurred.  That said, both of these pieces are of 
a different character than the rest of the report; the National 
Association of Medical Examiners distinguishes between “the 
objective forensic autopsy with its findings including toxicological 
tests, special tests, microscopic examination, etc., and . . . the 
interpretations of the forensic pathologist including cause and 
30 Id. at 19. 
31 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING 
THE CAUSE-OF-DEATH SECTION OF THE DEATH CERTIFICATE (2004), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/blue_form.pdf.  
32 PETERSON & CLARK, supra note 5, at 20. “Manner of death” specifically 
assists: “1) in determining accurate causes of death, 2) in processing insurance 
claims, and 3) in statistical studies of injuries and death.” CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 31. 
33 PETERSON & CLARK, supra note 5, at 20. 
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manner of death.”34
Finally, the numerous addenda that may accompany an 
autopsy report deserve mention.  Diagrams, photographs, and/or 
audio-video recordings often accompany the report and serve as 
evidence at trial.
  This characterization is crucial in discussing 
the potential admissibility of autopsy reports without the 
presence of their preparers, and will be explored in greater detail 
below. 
35  They provide important supporting evidence 
to corroborate the written descriptions and the ultimate findings 
of the report.  Photographs and audio and visual recordings can 
also confirm procedure and reported observations.  Together, 
these addenda perform several functions: “to support or refute 
interpretations, to provide evidence for court, and to serve as a 
record.”36
This basic understanding of the key elements of an autopsy 
report permits a more comprehensive evidentiary and 
constitutional analysis of autopsy reports.  Before arriving at the 
constitutional question of confrontation, it is important to take 
the pieces of the autopsy report that have just been introduced, 
plug them into the existing evidentiary framework, and explore 
their interaction with the justice system. 
  As with the evidence amassed and preserved for the 
identification of the deceased, these additional pieces can retain 
detailed data that can preserve some level of independent review, 
although that review must be, in almost every case, short of 
actually performing a second autopsy. 
B.  The Federal Rules of Evidence 
In analyzing whether an autopsy report or a particular 
element of an autopsy report is testimonial, evidentiary 
underpinnings frame the analysis—although they ultimately 
operate in concert with the constitutional issues to be discussed 
below.  In particular, the Federal Rules of Evidence regarding 
hearsay, expert testimony, and exceptions to hearsay are vital to 




34 Id. at 18. 
35 Id. at 10. 
36 Id. 
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The Federal Rules of Evidence devote an entire article to 
hearsay.37  Hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than one 
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, 
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”38  
The Rules consider hearsay in such detail because it raises the 
judicial issue of trustworthiness,39 and because it raises the 
constitutional issue embodied in the Confrontation Clause.40
Although the hearsay rule and hearsay exceptions provide a 
foundational basis for understanding the Confrontation Clause’s 
place in gathering testimony as evidence, hearsay evidence does 
not always violate the Confrontation Clause.  As the Court held 
in California v. Green, “merely because evidence is admitted in 
violation of a long-established hearsay rule does not lead to the 
automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have been 
denied.”
  
Because the declarant is not present on the witness stand, there 
is often no way to judge whether the statement reported by the 
witness was the declarant’s actual statement or whether the 
statement was actually a true and credible statement.  Similarly, 
there is usually no way to confront the declarant when the 
witness speaks for him or her. 
41  The converse holds as well:  Confrontation rights are 
not exhaustively protected by hearsay exceptions, specifically 
because hearsay is not a constitutional principle and its 
definition and exceptions are based in statute.42  Green identified 
the relationship between hearsay and violations of the 
Confrontation Clause as overlapping, but not completely;43
 
37 See FED. R. EVID. 801–07. 
 
therefore showing that just because a hearsay exception applies 
does not automatically prove that the right to confront has been 
satisfied.  That said, the interplay between hearsay and the  
 
38 Id. 801(c). 
39 See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973) (“The hearsay rule, 
which has long been recognized and respected by virtually every State, is based on 
experience and grounded in the notion that untrustworthy evidence should not be 
presented to the triers of fact.”). 
40 See Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 220 (1974) (“The primary 
justification for the exclusion of hearsay is the lack of any opportunity for the 
adversary to cross-examine the absent declarant whose out-of-court statement is 
introduced into evidence.”). 
41 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970). 
42 Note, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE L.J. 1434, 1436 (1966). 
43 399 U.S. at 156. 
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Confrontation Clause has led to the development of some of the 
hearsay exceptions.  The long and intertwined history of the two 
provides a frame of reference for measuring evidentiary issues.44
The hearsay rule is notably porous; it has twenty-nine 
exceptions in the Rules.
 
45  Several of these exceptions might 
apply to an autopsy report or portions of the autopsy report, 
notably, as a record of regularly conducted activity,46 as a public 
record or report,47 as a record of vital statistics,48 as a recorded 
recollection,49 or under the residual exception.50
The business record, public record, and vital statistics 
exceptions touch on one another in the case of an autopsy report.  
An autopsy report satisfies the requirements of a business record 
as a report of opinions and diagnoses, “made at or near the time 
by . . . a person with knowledge, . . . kept in the course of a 
regularly conducted business activity, and . . . it was the regular 
practice of that business activity to make the . . . report.”
  These can be 
separated into three distinct groups: exception as a business, 
public, or medical record; exception as a recollection that 
captures the ME’s impressions; and exception in the interest of 
justice.   
51  This 
can be confirmed by the custodian, a qualified witness, or by 
certification under the Rules or a relevant statute.52  The rule 
includes an expansive definition of “business,”53 seemingly 
leaving this exception open to broad interpretation.  The public 
records exception also seems to cover autopsy reports by 
excepting reports of public offices “setting forth . . . the activities 
of the office . . . [or] matters observed pursuant to duty imposed 
by law as to which matters there was a duty to report.”54  The 
rule does not allow law enforcement personnel’s reports to escape 
categorization as hearsay under the public record exception,55
 
44 See, e.g., Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 61 (1899) (dying declaration 
exception). 
 but 
45 See FED. R. EVID. 803, 804, 807. 
46 See id. 803(6) (business record exception). 
47 See id. 803(8). 
48 See id. 803(9). 
49 See id. 803(5). 
50 See id. 807. 
51  Id. 803(6). 
52 See id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 803(8). 
55 See id. 803(8)(B). 
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it is a stretch to include MEs as law enforcement personnel.56  
The vital statistics exception could also support the admission of 
an autopsy report, excepting “[r]ecords or data compilations, in 
any form, of . . . deaths . . . if the report was made to a public 
office pursuant to requirements of law.”57
Several cases have explored the admissibility of autopsy 
reports within the framework of these hearsay exceptions.  In 
Sosna v. Binnington, the Eighth Circuit held that an autopsy 
report qualified as a business record and that “the opinions of the 
pathologist contained in his autopsy report fit comfortably within 
Rule 803(6)’s confines.”
 
58  In United States v. Feliz, the Second 
Circuit also found that autopsy reports prepared by the Office of 
the Chief Medical Examiner fall under the business record 
exception.59  In United States v. Rosa, the Second Circuit held 
that an autopsy report qualified as a public record under 
803(8)(B), stating that, in contrast to the adversarial approach of 
law enforcement agents, “a medical examiner’s reported 
observations as to a body’s condition are normally made as part 
of an independent effort to determine a cause of death.”60
 
56 Even if they were, the Senate Judiciary Committee found that the recorded 
observations of a law enforcement officer who was unavailable “should be admitted 
as the best available evidence.” S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 17 (1974); see also State v. 
Manocchio, 497 A.2d 1, 7 (R.I. 1985) (declining to include MEs within the category of 
“police officers and other law-enforcement personnel”); cf. United States v. Hansen, 
583 F.2d 325, 333 (7th Cir. 1978) (“We do not believe we are justified in broadening 
the interpretation of the rules phrase ‘police officers and other law enforcement 
personnel’ to include city building inspectors.”). But cf. Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2536 (2009) (“A forensic analyst responding to a 
request from a law enforcement official may feel pressure—or have an incentive—to 
alter the evidence in a manner favorable to the prosecution.”). 
  The 
Second Circuit upheld the exclusion of the report’s conclusions 
while admitting the observations, and holding that 803(8)(C) only 
57 FED. R. EVID. 803(9). It may only be intended to apply to the likes of death 
certificates, but the cause of death and manner of death appear on a death 
certificate as well. Since those are the less objective portions of an autopsy, it would 
seem to undermine the purpose of the exception to allow only the conclusions and 
not the supporting observations into evidence. 
58 321 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2003). 
59 See 467 F.3d 227, 236–37 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that autopsy reports fall 
within the business record exception notably because the Office of the Chief Medical 
Examiner is an “independent office,” and the autopsies are performed and the 
reports are prepared “without regard to the likelihood of their use at trial”). For an 
additional opinion see United States v. Feliz, 201 F. App’x 814 (2d Cir. 2006). 
60 11 F.3d 315, 332 (2d Cir. 1993). 
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applies to evidence presented against the Government.61  The 
First Circuit, a decade later, held that a death certificate could 
not be redacted under 803(8)(C) unless its trustworthiness was 
called into question.62  The First Circuit also analogized medical 
records and autopsy reports, holding that, so long as it seems 
reliable, an autopsy report, including its opinions and diagnoses, 
ought to be admissible under 803(6).63
Another route that can be explored to overcome the hearsay 
rule is based on the idea that when the report was written, it 
captured the testimony of the ME at that time.  While the time 
between the autopsy and time of report is likely too long to 
satisfy the present sense impression exception, which is reserved 
for descriptions or explanations made while observing the event 
“or immediately thereafter,”
  Against this backdrop, 
evidentiary exceptions seem to approach autopsy reports with 
flexibility, permitting their admission as business records and as 
public records.   
64 it is of great importance in terms of 
the recorded recollection exception, which allows a witness to use 
a recorded recollection to testify on a matter the witness once had 
knowledge of, but has insufficient recollection of while 
testifying.65  Because MEs perform many autopsies, and the time 
between an autopsy and an ensuing trial can be months, even 
years, the recorded recollection exception can assist them in 
entering their findings as noted in the autopsy report into 
evidence.  It also offers assistance to the supervising pathologist 
when a forensic pathologist in training, working under direct 
supervision, performs an autopsy that is pertinent to a criminal 
trial.66
 
61 Id. at 333. When the Second Circuit encountered this decision in ruling on 
Feliz, it sidestepped the issue on the grounds that the defendants did not challenge 
the report’s admission as a business record and that the report’s admission was 
harmless error because the witness who testified provided his own conclusions based 
on the observations in the report. See Feliz, 467 F.3d at 236 n.6. 
  Particularly, in such a case, the supervising pathologist’s 
recollection may not be so strong, and the other pathologist will  
 
 
62 See Blake v. Pellegrino, 329 F.3d 43, 48–49 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding that a 
subjective valuation of its substantive conclusions, such as the cause of death, was 
insufficient to redact a death certificate). 
63 See Manocchio v. Moran, 919 F.2d 770, 780–81 (1st Cir. 1990). 
64 FED. R. EVID. 803(1). 
65 See id. 803(5). 
66 See AM. BD. OF PATHOLOGY, supra note 4, at 7. 
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likely have moved on after her fellowship, leaving the supervisor 
to step in and offer testimony.  In such a case, the recorded 
recollection exception will serve the pathologist well.   
Finally, the autopsy report may be entered under the catch-
all residual exception.  To fall within the residual exception, the 
statement must have “circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness.”67
the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; . . . the 
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered 
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure 
through reasonable efforts; and . . . the general purposes of 
these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by 
admission of the statement into evidence.
  The Rules require a showing that  
68
In Manocchio v. Moran, the First Circuit did not expressly 
use Rule 807 in finding an autopsy report’s admission 
constitutional, instead using the more concrete 803(6) and (8).
   
69  
The court did seemingly use the analysis in seeking out 
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” to satisfy the 
Confrontation Clause.70  The court held that because the autopsy 
report was “properly authenticated” and because there was no 
showing that the ME had any “motivation . . . to falsify the 
report,” any inclusion of double hearsay based on the police 
report was harmless error “because the accuracy of the included 
information was not in issue.”71  The court also found that the 
report’s ruling of “homicide” was “no more than a restatement of 
the examiner’s medical conclusion that death resulted from the 
multiple injuries observed on the decedent’s body.”72  While this 
is in no way a complete accounting of how Rule 807 and autopsy 
reports interact, it provides a blueprint.  Given the other 
considerations in the hypothetical of the unavailable ME,73
Another portion of the Federal Rules of Evidence that is 
important to the discussion of the introduction of autopsy reports 
into evidence is contained in Article VII, which covers opinions 
 and 
the demands of 807, the court lays out a path worth considering 
for introducing an autopsy report through Rule 807. 
 
67 FED. R. EVID. 807. 
68 Id. 
69 919 F.2d 770, 775–76 (1st Cir. 1990). 
70 Id. at 777. 
71 Id.  
72 Id. 
73 See infra Part II.B. 
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and expert testimony.74  An expert witness is one 
“qualified . . . by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education [to] testify . . . in the form of an opinion or otherwise,” 
generally in the field of science or technology.75  The Rules insist 
on three criteria for expert testimony: that it be “based upon 
sufficient facts or data,” that it be “the product of reliable 
principles and methods,” and that the expert “appl[y] the 
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.”76
While this Note has thusfar been concerned with the 
evidentiary issue of hearsay, these exceptions to the hearsay rule 
were introduced to the discussion to examine the trial court 
standard that has been applied to measure many Confrontation 
Clause issues.  While these Rules are subject to judicial and 
congressional amendment, they were drafted by the Supreme 
Court and have survived with limited amendment since 1975.
  MEs 
often qualify as expert witnesses and, in that capacity, can offer 
their opinions on the facts presented.  This is important for cases 
where portions of a death certificate or autopsy report have been 
redacted.  An expert witness, even without prior knowledge of 
the case, can provide her opinion of the observations included in 
the autopsy report, either to provide the defendant with a second 
opinion, or to provide the prosecution with expert testimony that 
fills the evidentiary gap created by the redaction. 
77  
Presumably, the Court accounted for the Confrontation Clause in 
drafting the Rules;78 that also presumes, however, that courts 
have interpreted them according to their intent.  So while the 
hearsay exceptions, as they have come to be understood, strongly 
support the introduction of an autopsy report if its creator is 
unavailable, that interpretation is “an adjunct to the 
confrontation right in constitutional areas.”79
 
74 See FED. R. EVID. 702–05. 
  The dispositive  
 
75 Id. 702. 
76 Id. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), for the 
Supreme Court’s lead case on the qualification of experts and the treatment of their 
testimony. 
77 See Glenn Weissenberger, The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307, 1319–21 (1992). 
78 Congress’s Advisory Committee extensively analyzed confrontation as it 
relates to hearsay while considering the 1987 Amendment. See FED. R. EVID. art. 
VIII advisory committee’s note. 
79 Id. 
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analysis in the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence explores whether or not the nature of the evidence 
is “testimonial.”80
C. Confrontation Under the Sixth Amendment 
   
Under the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution, “[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . be 
confronted with the witnesses against him.”81  This basic 
protection is designed to allow for the cross-examination of one’s 
accuser on the testimony and evidence he or she presents.82  
Cross-examination grants the opportunity to the accused to 
expose inconsistent statements, witness bias, credibility issues, 
and other similarly important characteristics of the testimony so 
that the jury has all of the information it requires to weigh the 
testimony presented.83  In a system that presumes innocence, it 
is paramount to allow the accused the maximum opportunity to 
cast doubt on guilt.  The right to confront and cross-examine has 
existed since the earliest days of the Union,84 and it was 
explicitly incorporated in 1965 to apply to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment in Pointer v. Texas.85
 
80 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) and its 
predecessors for an analysis of testimonial evidence as it relates to the Confrontation 
Clause. 
  From that was 
born a line of cases that developed and refined how courts and 
parties looked at the Confrontation Clause, that considered the  
 
81 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
82 See Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899) (“[A] fact which can be 
primarily established only by witnesses cannot be proved . . . except by witnesses 
who confront him at the trial, upon whom he can look while being tried, whom he is 
entitled to cross-examine, and whose testimony he may impeach in every mode 
authorized by the established rules . . . .”). 
83 See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895) (“The primary object 
of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depositions or ex parte 
affidavits . . . in lieu of a . . . cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused 
has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of 
the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that 
they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in 
which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.”). 
84 See Kirby, 174 U.S. at 55 (“One of the fundamental guaranties of life and 
liberty is found in the [S]ixth [A]mendment of the [C]onstitution of the United 
States . . . .”). 
85 380 U.S. 400, 407–08 (1965) (reversing a defendant’s conviction for a denial of 
his Sixth Amendment rights on the grounds that testimony from a preliminary 
hearing cannot be used if the declarant cannot be confronted in open court). 
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role of policy in confrontation matters, and that wholly redefined 
the type of evidence that required confrontation to survive 
introduction into evidence.   
1. History Leading up to Melendez-Diaz 
The Confrontation Clause’s relationship to state policy 
interests was squarely addressed with the Court’s ruling in Davis 
v. Alaska.86  In Davis, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment 
overcomes even strong state policy considerations.87  The key 
prosecution witness in this case was a juvenile delinquent who 
was on probation, but because Alaska had a law protecting 
juvenile delinquents from the release of this information, the 
defendant was not permitted to confront the witness and to 
attempt to impeach his credibility on his probationary status.88  
The Court held that the defendant must be allowed to cross-
examine his accuser despite the State’s interest in protecting the 
anonymity of juvenile offenders, and found no reason to allow the 
People to put forth any alternative to the actual accuser.89  In 
weighing the interests, the defendant’s opportunity to show bias 
and cast suspicions on a key identifying witness of the 
prosecution in an effort to avoid conviction far outweighed the 
embarrassment the witness and his family might feel.90  With 
this decision, the Court made it clear that state policy interests 
alone cannot overcome the constitutional guarantee to confront.91
Confrontation Clause rights ebbed and flowed through the 
end of the millennium, reaching their low-water mark under 
Ohio v. Roberts.
 
92  In this case, the defendant, accused of, among 
other things, forgery, called a witness at a preliminary hearing, 
pressed her for information, and tried to elicit an admission from 
her that she had misled the defendant; when the case went to 
trial, she was subpoenaed but did not appear, and could not be 
found even by her mother.93
 
86 415 U.S. 308 (1974). 
  At trial, the defendant claimed that 
87 See id. at 319 (“We do not and need not challenge the State’s interest as a 
matter of its own policy in the administration of criminal justice to seek to preserve 
the anonymity of a juvenile offender.”). 
88 Id. at 309. 
89 Id. at 320. 
90 Id. at 319. 
91 See id. at 320. 
92 448 U.S. 56 (1980), overruled by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
93 Id. at 58–60. 
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the witness had misled him, so the State introduced the 
transcript from the preliminary hearing to counter that claim.94  
The defense objected, claiming a violation of the Confrontation 
Clause.95  The Court held that prosecutors must only make a 
good faith effort to make witnesses available for cross-
examination.96  The Court found that the defense did effectively 
take advantage of an opportunity to cross-examine the witness 
during the preliminary hearing—even though it was a direct 
examination in form and purpose, it comported to a cross-
examination.97  The Court also found that the witness displayed 
the requisite “indicia of reliability” in her testimony.98  The 
Roberts Court built its reasoning off of the maxim that “[t]he law 
does not require the doing of a futile act,” noting that a dead 
witness—or a live one that had run away to another state and 
could not be tracked down—cannot be expected to be cross-
examined, and the prosecution’s efforts to locate any other 
unavailable witness will be judged by the standard of 
reasonableness.99  In short, the Court presented the analysis 
along bifurcated lines:  If the defendant had the opportunity to 
cross-examine the witness, the witness’s testimony must be 
reliable; and if the witness is unavailable, the prosecution must 
have made a good faith effort to locate her.100  In this context, the 
Court makes it clear that hearsay evidence can satisfy the 
Confrontation issues it faces.101  This analysis prevailed for over 
two decades, but with the new millennium came a revised 
outlook.102
 
94 Id. at 59. 
 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 74.  
97 Id. at 66, 70–71, 73. 
98 Id. at 73 (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972)). 
99 Id. at 74. 
100 See id. at 66, 74. 
101 Id. at 65 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934) (“[T]he 
[c]lause countenances only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that ‘there is 
no material departure from the reason of the general rule.’ ”)); see also id. at 66 
(quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895) (“[C]ertain hearsay 
exceptions rest upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence 
within them comports with the ‘substance of the constitutional protection.’ ”)). 
102 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 69 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring). 
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Under Crawford v. Washington, the Court overruled Roberts 
and set out in a completely new direction.103  In Crawford, the 
Court unanimously decided that testimonial statements made 
out of court were inadmissible, regardless of the reliability of the 
statements, unless the witness was unavailable and the 
defendant had an earlier opportunity to cross-examine the 
witness.104  In this case, the defendant was charged with assault 
and attempted murder for stabbing a man who allegedly tried to 
rape his wife.105  The trial court admitted the tape of a police 
interrogation of his wife, in which she undercut the husband’s 
self-defense claim, under a hearsay exception and deemed it 
reliable.106  She did not testify at trial, claiming protection under 
a state spousal immunity law.107  The Court held that while this 
satisfied a hearsay exception, it violated the Confrontation 
Clause because it fell within “this core class of ‘testimonial’ 
statements.”108  Testimonial statements are characterized as in-
court testimony or the functional equivalent, made ex parte, not 
permitting an opportunity for cross-examination, and are 
reasonably expected by the declarant to be used at trial.109
The Court then went on to declare, also unanimously, in 
Davis v. Washington, that when the author of “testimony” offered 
it with the expectation that it would be used as evidence, it would 
be considered testimonial and would trigger the defendant’s right 
to confront the author.
  By 
shifting the Confrontation Clause jurisprudence to the 
testimonial or nontestimonial nature of the statements, the 
Court delivered an absolute right, independent of hearsay 
exceptions, to have the opportunity to cross-examine the 
declarant on testimonial statements. 
110
 
103 See id. From the Court’s opinion, this is not immediately clear, because 
Justice Scalia never bluntly overrules Roberts. But the dissent leads with such a 
blunt statement, and, only weeks later, other courts began to proclaim the end of 
Roberts. See, e.g., State v. Brown 156 S.W.3d 722, 731 (Ark. 2004). It should be noted 
that other courts stated that the Roberts approach had instead been abrogated. See, 
e.g., United States v. Saner, 313 F. Supp. 2d 896, 898 (S.D. Ind. 2004). This fine 
distinction, however, has no bearing on the issues presented in this Note. 
  Davis was a domestic violence case, in 
104 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59. 
105 Id. at 38. 
106 Id. at 40. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 51. 
109 Id. Please note that this is a characterization and not a definition. 
110 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
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which the defendant was charged with violating a domestic no-
contact order.111  The State introduced a 911 transcript of the 
victim’s call, because the victim would not testify.112  Its 
companion case, Hammon v. Indiana, involved a domestic 
battery in which the State introduced the victim’s affidavit and 
the officer who was on the scene gave hearsay evidence of what 
the victim said; again, the victim did not testify.113  The Court 
held that “[s]tatements are nontestimonial when . . . the primary 
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet 
an ongoing emergency.  They are testimonial when . . . the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past 
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”114  The 
911 transcripts were admitted without the victim’s testimony or 
availability for cross-examination because they were prepared to 
respond to the emergency; but the affidavit and the victim’s 
statements were ruled “inherently testimonial” as they served as 
a “substitute for live testimony.”115  Within this framework, the 
distinguishing feature is whether or not the statement is being 
offered for trial or for the matter at hand.  Justice Thomas, 
however, has been very critical of the “testimonial” approach in 
his opinions, labeling it as “unpredictable.”116
Prior to Crawford and Davis, prosecutors only had to show 





111 Id. at 818. 
  Good faith, in effect, created a safe harbor for 
using hearsay evidence.  Crawford and Davis, though, combined 
to gut this safe harbor for prosecutors and law enforcement 
agents.  The Court, in a short time, had changed the analysis 
from questions of availability, reliability, and good faith, to 
questions of the testimonial nature of the evidence and the 
presence or absence of an earlier opportunity to cross-examine.  
The abrogation of Roberts signified a new and significant check 
on prosecutors, setting aside questions of hearsay and placing it 
112 Id. at 817–19. 
113 Id. at 819–20. 
114 Id. at 822. 
115 Id. at 829–30. 
116 Id. at 834 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas does not even consider it 
a Confrontation Clause issue, only finding it triggered when there is “solemnity” to 
the proceeding. Id. at 837–38. 
117 See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980), overruled by Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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squarely in the constitutional realm.118
2. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts  
  The preeminence of the 
Sixth Amendment seemed to have reached its apex, but this was 
only a new height, soon to be surpassed for the introduction of 
forensic reports. 
Melendez-Diaz imposed an even more rigorous interpretation 
of the Confrontation Clause on prosecutors to introduce scientific 
findings on evidence.  A coconspirator of the defendant had been 
engaged in suspicious activities to which a coworker had tipped 
off the police.119  The police investigation led to the arrest of three 
men and to the seizure of several plastic bags containing a 
substance that appeared to be cocaine.120  On the drive to the 
police station, the officers noticed the men “fidgeting and making 
furtive movements,” so they searched the cruiser after dropping 
the men at the station and found more plastic bags containing a 
substance that also appeared to be cocaine.121  All of the seized 
evidence was sent to a state lab for analysis.122  At trial, the bags 
were placed into evidence, along with three “ ‘certificates of 
analysis’ ” that reported the weight of the bags and identified 
their contents as cocaine.123  In accordance with Massachusetts 
law, the certificates had been sworn to by state lab analysts 
before a notary public.124
Defendant’s counsel objected on the grounds that his client 
was denied the right to confront the analysts who had prepared 
the certificates of analysis, and while the objection was overruled 
at trial, a sharply divided Supreme Court came down on the side 





118 See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (“Where testimonial statements are 
involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s 
protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of 
‘reliability.’ ”). 
  When the Court issued its decision, many 
prosecutors were concerned with how this would impact their 
119 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2530 (2009). 
120 Id. 
121 Id.  
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 2530–31 (quoting Petition For Writ of Certiorari at Appendix 24a, 26a, 
28a, Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (No. 07-591), 2007 WL 3252033). 
124 Id. at 2531. 
125 Id. at 2531–32. 
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ability to use forensic evidence at trial.126  The Court held that 
“[t]he Sixth Amendment does not permit the prosecution to prove 
its case via ex parte out-of-court affidavits, and the admission of 
such evidence against Melendez-Diaz was error.”127  In other 
words, a defendant must be afforded the constitutional 
opportunity to cross-examine the particular state-employed 
analyst responsible for a laboratory report for the report to be 
introduced into evidence at trial.  Within this “straightforward  
application of . . . Crawford,”128
Justice Thomas’s concurrence in particular, as the fifth vote 
in Melendez-Diaz and as a past critic of the Court’s approach in 
Davis,
 however, there is a large degree 
of ambiguity explored in Part II below.  The Court’s division also 
limits the reach of the decision. 
129 limits the Court’s ruling.  While he joined the majority, 
his concurrence clarified that his stance in this case was 
motivated by the nature and format of the forensic report.130  He 
reiterated his stance from White v. Illinois131 and from Davis that 
“ ‘the Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial 
statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized 
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior 
testimony, or confessions.’ ”132  Since the forensic report was in 
the form of an affidavit, Justice Thomas came to the same 
conclusion as the majority;133 as the deciding vote in a 5-4 
decision, however, he limited the scope of the decision to the 
narrowest grounds of his concurrence.134
 
126 See Adam Liptak, Justices Rule Crime Analysts Must Testify on Lab Results, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2009, at A1. 
  This raises a significant 
question of whether the Court divided along the lines of form or 
substance.  Justice Scalia’s opinion in Davis focused on the 
127 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2542 (reiterating that Melendez-Diaz is only an 
application of Crawford). 
128 Id. at 2533. 
129 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 834 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting majority, 547 U.S. at 822) (“Today, a mere 
two years after the Court decided Crawford, it adopts an equally unpredictable test, 
under which district courts are charged with divining the ‘primary purpose’ of police 
interrogations.”). 
130 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
131 502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
132 Id. (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)); see also Davis, 547 U.S. at 836 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
133 See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532. 
134 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
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primary purpose of the interrogation, suggesting that substance 
is most important to him,135 while Justice Thomas, in Melendez-
Diaz, continued to require formalized testimonial materials.136
II. UNDERSTANDING HOW MELENDEZ-DIAZ APPLIES TO AUTOPSY 
REPORTS  
  It 
remains an open question as to whether the information, 
delivered in another format—for example, a computer print out 
of the lab results—without “formalized testimonial material” of 
the analyst that ran the test, would steer clear of Justice 
Thomas’s proscription.  Likewise, his stance on autopsy reports—
which are prepared for many deaths, not only for criminal 
matters—remains undefined.  As a result, prosecutors, MEs, and 
courts are left to wonder how they must manage autopsy reports 
in criminal matters. 
The majority opinion of Melendez-Diaz only mentions 
autopsies once, in the Court’s fifth footnote.137  The dissent uses 
the admission of autopsy reports in half a dozen cases as 
evidence of a historical trend against considering forensic 
analysis testimonial.138  In each of these instances in which 
autopsy reports are mentioned, they are lumped in with other 
forensic analyses and never addressed as a unique matter.  At no 
point does the Court consider the distinctions between general 
lab reports and autopsy reports.  Autopsy reports, however, are a 
different type of forensic report, prepared regardless of criminal 
activity139 and often in its absence at a hospital or at the request 
of a family.  Autopsy reports are not prepared in anticipation of 
trial, and their use at trial, just like the use of medical records at 
trial, is incidental.140
 
135 See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
  Autopsy reports also involve different 
136 See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
137 The text and footnote read, respectively: “Respondent and the dissent may be 
right that there are other ways—and in some cases better ways—to challenge or 
verify the results of a forensic test,” Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536; “Though 
surely not always. Some forensic analyses, such as autopsies and breathalyzer tests, 
cannot be repeated, and the specimens used for other analyses have often been lost 
or degraded.” Id. n.5. 
138 See id. at 2554–60 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
139 So long as other criteria are met. See PETERSON & CLARK, supra note 5, at 3–
4. 
140 See United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Office of 
the Chief Medical Examiner of New York conducts thousands of routine autopsies 
every year, without regard to the likelihood of their use at trial.”). 
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policy implications, as their primary functions are to serve public 
health officials in prioritizing health risks and to stand as the 
final medical record for the individual.141  The status of autopsy 
reports unaccompanied by the testimony of the MEs that 
prepared them is uncertain in criminal cases under Melendez-
Diaz, and courts have recently grappled with this and come down 
on opposite sides.142  The argument that autopsy reports are 
different and should not be considered as formalized testimonial 
material carries some weight.  As that argument has been 
foreclosed in some jurisdictions,143 barring a Supreme Court 
reversal, it requires a more creative solution.  So with minor 
adjustments, either by the MEs or by the courts, to separate 
observations from rationales and conclusions, the majority of any 
autopsy report should be admissible without the testimony of the 
pathologist who performed the autopsy.144  Ideally, the ME would 
be present; but if the ME were unavailable—through change of 
job, relocation, sickness, or death—large portions of the report 
should still survive admission.145
A. Interpreting Melendez-Diaz 
  Particularly because of the 
uncertainty of the opinion’s breadth, and the difficulties that 
courts have had in applying Melendez-Diaz, the question remains 
open. 
Along with the restrictions placed on the opinion by Justice 
Thomas’s concurrence,146
 
141 See MED. EXAM’RS’ & CORONERS’ HANDBOOK, supra note 14.  
 the Court wrestled with the breadth of 
its opinion, the determination of the actual analyst, the 
testimonial—or nontestimonial—nature of the evidence, and the 
142 See, e.g., Wood v. State, 299 S.W.3d 200, 215–16 (Tex. App. 2009) (holding 
that an expert witness testifying on an autopsy report he did not prepare violated 
the Confrontation Clause); Commonwealth v. Avila, 912 N.E.2d 1014, 1029 (Mass. 
2009) (holding that while the autopsy report itself was not admissible, a substitute 
ME could testify as an expert and provide his opinions based on a review of the 
autopsy report). 
143 See, e.g., State v. Locklear, 681 S.E.2d 293, 304–05 (N.C. 2009) (using 
Melendez-Diaz to define an autopsy report as testimonial). 
144 Cf. Manocchio v. Moran, 919 F.2d 770, 778–84 (1st Cir. 1990) (describing the 
four different categories of information in an autopsy report as they relate to 
admissibility).  
145 Cf. People v. Freycinet, 11 N.Y.3d 38, 42, 892 N.E.2d 843, 846, 862 N.Y.S.2d 
450, 453 (2008) (holding that an autopsy report with opinions redacted was 
admissible even though the ME who performed it was not available to testify).  
146 See supra Part I.C.2. 
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consequences of its decision.  There are several ways to interpret 
Melendez-Diaz: as an application of Crawford,147 as an extension 
of Crawford,148 or merely as a fact pattern that survived a 
Crawford and Davis analysis.149  While the third approach 
accounts for Justice Thomas’s tenuous vote and likely is the most 
accurate reflection of the Court, the battle in state courts has 
been between the first two interpretations.150  Should the third 
interpretation accurately reflect the Court’s sentiment, it should 
be expected that the Court will grant certiorari when the 
appropriate case arises to clarify its stance and correct the 
rulings below.151
The Court claimed that its ruling was merely an application 
of Crawford.
  The other two interpretations create different 
results. 
152  It certainly satisfies the Crawford analysis as the 
certificates stated “ ‘[t]he substance was found to contain: 
Cocaine,’ ”153 and were prepared and notarized for the purpose of 
serving as evidence.154
The dissent, however, found it to be a broad-sweeping 
extension of Crawford, touching on many evidentiary issues, 
impacting numerous fields of science and forensics beyond drug 
identification, and creating more confusion than clarity.
  Crawford seems satisfied because these 
certificates were the functional equivalent of in-court testimony 
reasonably expected by the declarant to be used at trial, and the 
declarant was not available for cross-examination.  
155
 
147 The majority opinion stated this in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. 
Ct. 2527, 2533 (2009) (stating that its decision was a “rather straightforward 
application of our holding in Crawford”). 
  If the 
148 The dissenting opinion viewed it this way. Id. at 2552 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“The Court assumes, with little analysis, that Crawford and Davis 
extended the Clause to any person who makes a ‘testimonial’ statement.”). 
149 The concurring opinion suggested as much. See id. at 2543 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
150 See, e.g., State v. Locklear, 681 S.E.2d 293, 304–05 (N.C. 2009) (using 
Melendez-Diaz to define an autopsy report as testimonial); Commmonwealth v. 
Avila, 912 N.E.2d 1014, 1029 (Mass. 2009) (using Crawford to permit a substitute 
ME to testify as an expert and provide his opinions based on a review of the autopsy 
report, even though the autopsy report itself was not admissible). 
151 The Court may have been looking for something like that in Briscoe v. 
Virginia, but the facts must have ultimately proven uninspiring. See 130 S. Ct. 1316, 
1316 (2010). 
152 See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2542. 
153 Id. at 2537 (quoting Petition For Writ of Certiorari at Appendix 24a, 26a, 
28a, Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (No. 07-591), 2007 WL 3252033). 
154 See id. at 2531. 
155 See id. at 2543–58 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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Court’s most expansive approach were to apply, every analysis, 
every scientific fact, even the laws of physics would seem to be up 
for cross-examination.  
Similarly, there is a great deal of confusion over who is the 
actual analyst, especially as many of these analyses are 
performed by teams.156  The Court only noted that “it is not the 
case, that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in 
establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or 
accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part of 
the prosecution’s case,”157 but the dissent astutely pointed out the 
following simple question:  If not everyone, then who must be 
made available for cross-examination?158
Also, while the majority built its rationale on the Crawford 
definition of “testimonial,” the dissent found that to be of little 
assistance in limiting the impact of Melendez-Diaz.
 
159  The 
dissent accused the majority of introducing an approach that is 
“ ‘disconnected from history and unnecessary to prevent abuse’ ” 
by including experts and atypical witnesses within the matrix of 
witnesses that can provide testimonial materials.160  Justice 
Thomas was also wary, and specified that his definition of 
“testimonial” is narrower and more formal than the definition 
employed by the majority.161
Finally, as the Court so often does when it is sharply divided, 





156 See id. at 2544. 
  If the courts continue to interpret Melendez-Diaz as 
they had interpreted Crawford, then adjustments to statements 
for form would seem to satisfy most confrontation issues.  If, 
however, there is more to this decision, as the dissent 
vehemently stressed, the results will be grave for the justice 
157 See id. at 2532 n.1 (majority opinion). 
158 See id. at 2544–46 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
159 See id. at 2544. 
160 Id. (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 838 (2006) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
161 Compare id. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 
U.S. 346, 365 (1992)), with id. at 2531–32 (majority opinion) (quoting Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004)). The expansive, example-filled definition 
from Crawford contrasts with the limited and concise definition from White.  
162 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 827 (2008) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“Contrary to my usual practice, however, I think it appropriate to begin 
with a description of the disastrous consequences of what the Court has done 
today.”). 
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system, going against decades of statutory and judicial law,163 
unnecessarily increasing the burden on prosecutors, and 
undermining forensic analysis and the role of science in the 
courthouse.164  For the purposes of this Note, and whether courts 
interpret Melendez-Diaz as an application of Crawford or as a 
broad extension of Crawford, it is important to recognize that 
autopsy reports are now precariously positioned, and must be 
extracted from the general lump of forensic reports—as the 
dissent did in its appendices.165
The soundest course is to take the Court at its word and 
continue to apply Crawford with regard to autopsy reports.  
Crawford is still good law—decided recently by a unanimous 
Court—and offers a rule with which both Justice Thomas and the 
majority agree.
 
166  Pressing beyond the limits of Crawford invites 
great uncertainty, and the courts that have done so have found 
other grounds on which to avoid the outcomes that the dissent 
has described.167
 
163 The long history and the many states that had rules, cases, and policies 
affording lab reports unique admissibility included three state supreme courts, 
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2554 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting the decisions of 
the supreme courts of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Virginia; as opposed to 
Montana, which distinguished its constitution from the U.S. Constitution, and 
Oregon, which suggested notice might suffice), all circuit courts that considered it 
before Crawford, id. (noting cases in the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and 
Tenth Circuits), twenty-four state courts that followed suit, id. at 2554, 2558–60 
(pointing out decisions in California, Indiana, and Louisiana specifically excusing 
the results of autopsies from confrontation), and eleven states that upheld burden-
shifting statutes, id. at 2554. Sixteen state courts also upheld evidentiary rules 
permitting scientific test results without in-court testimony, id. at 2554, 2560 
(noting cases in California, New Jersey and New York, in particular), and the 
Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits came to similar results for federal hearsay 
rules,, id. at 2554–55 (as distinguished from a Second Circuit case that law 
enforcement reports cannot be similarly admitted). 
  In this legal atmosphere, the distinctions 
between lab reports and autopsy reports, and the unique 
interests at play with autopsy reports, make autopsy reports 
worthy of special consideration under Melendez-Diaz as an 
application of Crawford. 
164 See id. at 2547 (“There is nothing predictable here, however, other than the 
uncertainty and disruption that now must ensue.”). 
165 See id. at 2559–60. 
166 See id. at 2532 (majority opinion); id. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
167 See, e.g., State v. Locklear, 681 S.E.2d 293, 304–05 (N.C. 2009) (finding a 
violation of the Confrontation Clause in the introduction of an autopsy report where 
the forensic pathologist did not testify, but ruling the error harmless). 
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B. Applying Melendez-Diaz to Autopsy Reports 
While the Court in Melendez-Diaz was largely silent on 
autopsy reports, the fifth footnote made an offhand reference168 
that has already been used as authority for ruling against 
admission of an autopsy report.169  While the dissent carefully 
carved out some extra space for autopsy reports and noted that 
they are among the wide range of scientific activities that may be 
impacted by the decision,170 the majority made its stance less 
clear.  The issue under Crawford hinges on whether or not it is 
testimonial, and thus unexcused.171
In analyzing this hypothetical, there are several important 
factors to consider: what portions of this autopsy report can 
survive a hearsay objection; who could testify as to their validity; 
how do these forms of evidence differ from other laboratory 
analyses; and what potential pieces of evidence, if any, are 
testimonial.  The hearsay issue is an important threshold 
question, because the constitutional issue will not arise if the 
evidence is excluded on the basis of hearsay.
  For this Court, that rested 
the decision squarely on Justice Thomas.  For the sake of 
analysis, let us consider the facts of the following hypothetical.  A 
suspect is brought to trial on murder charges, and the evidence 
against him includes an autopsy report prepared by an ME who 
died two weeks after performing this autopsy alone.  The ME left 
photographs of the body and the wounds, an audio recording 
narrating what she observed, a simultaneous video recording 
capturing her actions and the same narration, and the blood and 
toxicology reports that she had used in preparing her report 
before she passed. 
172
 
168 See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536 n.5. 
  As discussed 
above, the autopsy report and its various addenda—not including 
the audio and video recordings, unless they were standard 
procedure—would likely survive admission under the business  
 
 
169 Locklear, 681 S.E.2d at 305 (“The Court specifically referenced autopsy 
examinations as one such kind of forensic analyses.”). 
170 See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2546 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
171 See id. at 2530–31 (majority opinion). 
172 This is a matter of pure logic—if evidence is excluded on evidentiary grounds, 
the court will not reach a potential constitutional issue. A violation of the 
Confrontation Clause cannot be claimed on evidence that was not admitted. 
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record exception or another 803 exception.173  The audio and 
video recordings could potentially be admitted as evidence of the 
ME’s present sense impression.174
Regardless of whether the report was admitted as a whole, 
an expert who had reviewed the files would likely be called to 
testify, and after years had passed, her independent review 
would likely be just as sound as the review of the ME who had 
initially performed it.  These factors already highlight one 
distinction of autopsy reports—because autopsies are only 
performed once,
 
175 any independent review is based on the 
information that the ME gathers during that initial 
investigation.  The ME is, therefore, charged with gathering 
enough supporting data to allow for independent review.176  
Autopsies are also much more complex than the identification of 
a narcotic, and are more prone to shades of gray, as their 
outcome is a diagnosis, not a chemical compound match.  
Similarly, while other forensic analyses may yield drug charges, 
rape charges, and a host of other unsavory activity, autopsy 
reports usually arise in situations where someone has died, so 
only permitting an autopsy report to survive as evidence for as 
long as its creator survives, would essentially create a statute of 
limitations for murder.177
The issue of which potential pieces of evidence prepared by 
our hypothetical ME are testimonial, if any, remains.  Under a 
Crawford analysis, these all provide the functional equivalent of 
in-court testimony, but even though the ME likely realized the 
documents would be used in a trial, they were not prepared for 
the primary purpose of serving as criminal evidence—instead 
they were prepared as a record of the state of the body, mandated 
by law for the purposes of public health and safety.  Introduction 
of the report through an expert, even if it is another ME, allows 
 
 
173 See supra Part I.B. 
174 See supra Part I.B. 
175 See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536 n.5. 
176 See PETERSON & CLARK, supra note 5, at 5–6, (requiring the gathering of 
enough supporting data for indpendent review in matters involving identification); 
see also id. at 10–11, 13–14 (setting the bare minimum standard for cases involving 
firearm injuries, sharp-force injuries, patterned injuries, and penetrating injuries, 
including gunshot and sharp-force injuries, and blunt-impact injuries). 
177 See Carolyn Zabrycki, Toward a Definition of “Testimonial”: How Autopsy 
Reports Do Not Embody the Qualities of a Testimonial Statement, 96 CAL. L. REV. 
1093, 1115 (2008). 
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for cross-examination on the facts in the report and the 
conclusions the expert has drawn.  This reinforces a point that 
will be returned to below:  In this hypothetical, the prosecution 
does not need the conclusions of the report—including those that 
would potentially upset the Confrontation balance—because the 
author of those conclusions could not be cross-examined.  At the 
same time, if those observations and facts can survive, an expert 
can provide the conclusions and can be cross-examined on them, 
satisfying one of the core goals of the Sixth Amendment.  It is 
important to note here that prior to Melendez-Diaz, including 
under Crawford, no court had found an autopsy report to be 
testimonial.178  While an autopsy report would not seem to fall 
within the core class of testimonial statements, it is very unlikely 
that Justice Thomas would find an autopsy report to fall within 
the limited criteria he lays out for “formalized testimonial 
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or 
confessions.”179  Autopsy reports are not gathered with the same 
formalities common to those other documents and are not 
specifically designed for the courtroom, so while the decision 
should not be so close, the Supreme Court, in its current 
composition,180
While policy is not dispositive,
 would likely declare an autopsy report to be 
nontestimonial. 
181 the interests involved make 
a strong case for protecting autopsy reports in their current 
format.  The human needs that autopsies serve, the significant 
role they play in people’s lives, and the incentives at play for an 
ME are all persuasive when considering the importance of 
leaving the format of autopsy reports relatively undisturbed, as 
compared with other forms of forensic analysis.  The dissent in 
Melendez-Diaz suggested that, even for the certificates of 
analysis, this was a more appropriate topic for the legislature in 
promulgating rules of evidence.182
 
178 See id. at 1094. 
  If the introduction of  
 
179 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
180 The departure of Justice David Souter and the arrival of Justice Sonya 
Sotomayor did not impact the Court’s thinking on Melendez-Diaz. See Briscoe v. 
Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010). 
181 See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974). 
182 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2555 (2009) (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting). 
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certificates of analysis were protected as a policy matter, the 
introduction of autopsy reports, with their unique policy 
implications, should be protected many times over. 
Autopsies touch on our humanity in a way that many other 
scientific analyses do not approach.  Autopsies are required for 
many, many deaths, and reports are not prepared only for 
suspected victims of criminal activity.183  Often they happen at 
the ME’s office, but they can also occur in private hospitals or in 
private practices.184  Those autopsies happening through the 
ME’s office are public services and produce public records.185
At the same time, autopsies are performed on human bodies 
just before they are prepared for their funerals and whatever 
religious rights they may be afforded.  Accordingly, the dead 
person’s humanity and dignity ought to be respected.  This is not 
simply another piece of evidence or the contents of a plastic bag, 
but something closer to a final medical report.  In considering 
what the Court should require in the unfortunate hypothetical in 
which our ME dies just after performing the autopsy and writing 
up the report, the Court must be sensitive, substantively, to our 
societal needs for a thorough review, for appropriate access to the 
report, and for a sense of closure for the family and for the State 
provided there were no improprieties in the autopsy or its 
reporting.   
  The 
conclusions of the physicians are open to interpretation by and 
challenge from the entire medical community—their professional 
reputations are forever on the line. 
It is also important to consider that MEs’ only incentives are 
to provide objective and accurate reports.186  Their jobs are to 
provide closure to people and to identify foul play when it is at 
work.187  Court appearances are incidental to the performance of 
their job.188
 
183 See United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing how 
the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner in New York performs thousands of routine 
autopsies annually without considering if or how they might be used at trial). 
  In Melendez-Diaz, Justice Scalia questioned the 
184 See Ron Shinkman, Autopsies R Us, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Feb. 5, 2001, at 58. 
185 Cf. SeaWorld Trainer’s Family Wants To Prevent Release of Video Footage of 
Accident, FOXNEWS.COM (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/03/09/ 
seaworld-trainers-family-wants-prevent-release-video-footage-accident/. 
186 See PETERSON & CLARK, supra note 5, at 1. 
187 Id. at 1–2. 
188 What Does a Forensic Pathologist Do?, NAT’L ASS’N OF MED. EXAM’RS (Nov. 8, 
2006), http://thename.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=39&Itemid 
=42. 
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motives of the forensic analysts as state employees,189 and, 
perhaps, he is right to do so because forensic analysts have very 
limited job opportunities beyond state-run laboratories.190  That 
said, by adjusting results to conform with the prosecution’s case, 
they risk the certification of the lab and their careers.191  On the 
other side, pathologists acting in a similar way would risk their 
licenses and their careers.192  Those careers cost hundreds of 
thousands of dollars and a decade, at least, to create.193
III. TAKING THE “TESTIMONIAL” OUT OF AUTOPSY REPORTS 
  They 
always have the alternative to work in private practice or in a 
hospital, so taking this job is hardly a “default” decision for them.  
Moreover, judges and MEs share several features, in being 
highly-trained state-employed professionals, at the pinnacle of 
their careers, greatly respected for their independent analysis 
and professional ability to be objective.  If Justice Scalia’s opinion 
is meant to reach as far as MEs, he indicts nearly every public 
servant, himself included.  Although the Court has moved away 
from issues of trustworthiness, leaving those for hearsay 
analysis, if we, as a society, were to allocate trust, much would be 
placed with our physicians, making the policy decision of 
protecting this work product that much more important. 
Autopsy reports are unlike the impersonal analysis of a bag 
of narcotics.  A person, whose story—whether tragic, heroic, or 
unremarkable—awaits a conclusion, lays bare on a cold table to 
have the question mark at the end of her life changed to a period.  
Most people will lay on that table one day, and pathologists will 
make routine examinations, much like the other check-ups 
experienced over the course of their lives.  This will allow 
families, friends, and loved ones to continue to live with the 
 
189 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2536–37 (2009). 
190 MEs’ other opportunities lay largely in academics and in the military. See 
Randy Skelton, So You Want To Be a Forensic Anthropologist?, http://www. 
nakedscience.org/foranth.htm (last revised May 24, 1996). 
191 See Sanctions, AM. SOC’Y OF CRIME LAB. DIR., LAB. ACCREDITATION BD., 
http://www.ascld-lab.org/monitoring/sanctions.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2011). 
192 For an example of the consequences of incompetence, let alone malicious 
tampering, see Carol Marbin Miller & Marc Caputo, Autopsy Uproar Not M.E.’s 
First, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 21, 2006. 
193 Tuition at Johns Hopkins Medical School was $39,500 for the 2009–2010 
academic year. Student Billing Information, JOHNS HOPKINS MED., 
http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/som/offices/finaffairs/billing (last visited Apr. 5, 
2011). 
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answers they have received and the closure they have been 
granted.  Autopsies are an important part of our social fabric and 
any adjustment to them must be weighed carefully.  
Some legal thinkers consider them testimonial,194
To begin, the long history of scientific evidence’s 
admissibility presented by the dissent of Melendez-Diaz applies 
with equal force as to why autopsies deserve special exception.  
Within the history of lab reports presented, there is a dividing 
line between general lab reports and autopsy reports.  The 
dissent subdivided the cases referenced in its appendices to treat 
autopsy and medical records cases as a separate subdivision.
 and it is 
more difficult, after the Court found in Melendez-Diaz that an 
affidavit stating that cocaine was cocaine was testimonial, to 
think a court would not find an autopsy report to be testimonial 
and to implicate the Confrontation Clause.  Although Justice 
Thomas and the Court may obviate the need for this if the right 
case arises, there is a solution in finding an exception to meet the 
needs of our society and the standards of our Bill of Rights.  In 
approaching the issue, it is important to understand why action 
must be taken. 
195  
Similarly, there is post-Crawford precedent for courts to find 
autopsy reports to be nontestimonial or, if testimonial, not 
prohibited from introduction because they are subject to a 
hearsay exception.196  In fact, every court that has decided this 
issue since Crawford has held that they are not testimonial,197 
until recently, when the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
pronounced its holding in State v. Locklear.198
The court in Locklear passed over many of the nuances of the 
issue and treated the autopsy report as “testimonial,” because it 
considered an autopsy report to be a forensic analysis and 
because the Court had referenced autopsy reports in the fifth 
footnote of Melendez-Diaz.
  By applying 
Melendez-Diaz to find an autopsy report testimonial, the high 
court of North Carolina sounded a warning bell.   
199
 
194 See, e.g., Zabrycki, supra note 177, at 1094. 
  The court ultimately found the 
195 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2558–61 (2009). 
196 See, e.g., United States v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d 121 (1st Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227 (2d Cir. 2006). 
197 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2546 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
198 681 S.E.2d 293, 304–05 (N.C. 2009). 
199 See State v. Locklear, 681 S.E.2d 293, 304–05 (N.C. 2009). 
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error harmless,200 but the brief and abridged analysis shows how 
wide open the issue is.201  A full Crawford analysis, rather than 
an abridged Melendez-Diaz analysis that ignores Justice 
Thomas’s concurrence, shows the flaws in this logic.  In 
Crawford, the Court specifically refused to define 
“testimonial,”202 but it had fleshed it out earlier in the decision to 
illustrate where it clearly existed.203  Testimonial is not a clear 
term that can be applied without qualification to all forensic 
analyses, especially in light of Justice Thomas’s concurrence in 
Melendez-Diaz.204  Locklear’s pro forma analysis skipped the vital 
step of determining whether the report was or was not 
testimonial, finding that an autopsy report, which was referenced 
only in a footnote, was immediately comparable to the certificate 
of analysis in Melendez-Diaz.205
But other courts that have approached the issue more 
thoroughly have reached different conclusions.  The Michigan 
Court of Appeals found autopsy reports, exclusive of their 
opinions and conclusions, can be used at trial without 
opportunity to cross-examine the ME, and that another expert 
witness can testify based on the observations embodied in the 
report.
  By not discussing its testimonial 
or nontestimonial nature, the court missed an opportunity to 
focus on the real issue. 
206  The court also found that autopsy reports survived as 
business records, which are expressly excused under Crawford.207  
The reasoning behind this is that the factual descriptions 
contained in an autopsy report provide for an accurate 
independent review—much as photos do—and do not constitute 
the type of testimony that is given in court.208
 
200 See id. at 304. 
  They 
201 Id. 
202 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (“We leave for another day 
any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’ ”). 
203 See id. at 51–52. 
204 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
205 See Locklear, 681 S.E.2d at 304–05. 
206 People v. King, No. 282533, 2010 WL 98693, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 
2010) (per curiam). 
207 See id. at *5; see also People v. Cortez, 931 N.E.2d 751, 756 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2010) (“Defendant suggests that the autopsy report admitted in this case is similar 
to the certificates admitted in Melendez-Diaz. However, defendant overlooks the fact 
that this court has previously held that autopsy reports are business records and do 
not implicate Crawford.”). 
208 King, 2010 WL 98693, at *4–*5. 
CP_Tsiatis (Do Not Delete) 7/14/2011  4:22 PM 
2011] PUTTING MELENDEZ-DIAZ ON ICE 389 
distinguished the case from Melendez-Diaz by pointing out that 
these were not “purely ‘bare-bones’ conclusory statements” and 
that autopsy reports were not actually singled out as violative of 
the Confrontation Clause.209  As a result, the court was 
comfortable in affirming the lower court and finding no violation 
of the Confrontation Clause.210
Other appellate courts have danced around the issue by 
looking at the standard for reversal and finding that, even if it 
were testimonial, it was not prejudicial.
 
211  In short, this issue is 
still open and there is still a strong argument that unless the 
Court expressly includes autopsy reports among testimonial 
documents, autopsy reports are admissible without the testimony 
of their authors.  Given the guidance the Judiciary has 
prescribed recently, it may be more effective to take proactive 
steps to trim and organize autopsy reports to meet their 
important objectives, while also paying mind to judicial trends, 
thus leaning them away from the testimonial label.212
IV. TOWARDS A “LEAN RULE” TO PROTECT CONFRONTATION 
RIGHTS AND THE SUBSTANCE OF AUTOPSY REPORTS 
 
While autopsy reports are prepared in the ordinary course of 
business, and are a matter of public record, they only fulfill their 
valuable public service if they contain the inferences and 
conclusions that the MEs draw.  If the Court were to make them 
inadmissible in court when they are so trusted and so common, 
this would not comport with the value generally assigned to 
them.  So the question remains, how can the results of an 
autopsy survive their author, if they cannot be preserved under 
the business records exception—a result which is in question 
after Melendez-Diaz.213
 
209 Id. at *3 (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543 
(2009)). 
 
210 Id. at *11. 
211 See, e.g., Mungo v. United States, 987 A.2d 1145 (D.C. 2010); State v. 
Locklear, 681 S.E.2d 293, 304–05 (N.C. 2009). 
212 Cf. People v. Freycinet, 11 N.Y.3d 38, 42, 892 N.E.2d 843, 846, 862 N.Y.S.2d 
450, 453 (2008) (autopsy report with opinions redacted was held not to be 
testimonial). While Freycinet was decided before Melendez-Diaz, its Crawford 
analysis would seem to conform with the Court’s approach in Melendez-Diaz.   
213 See Pendergrass v. State, 913 N.E.2d 703, 709–10 (Ind. 2009) (Rucker, J., 
dissenting). Contra King, 2010 WL 98693, at *5. 
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Melendez-Diaz challenges are being brought in many cases 
that involve lab reports, charging that the reports are testimonial 
and violate the defendant’s confrontation rights.214
By adjusting their practices, MEs and courts can hopefully 
help autopsy reports survive Melendez-Diaz—should it be 
interpreted to impact evidence to the level that the dissent 
fears—while also protecting the important civil liberties 
promised by the Sixth Amendment.  MEs must stay true to their 
duty to diagnose, and cannot shift formats to a checklist or to a 
simple list of detailed information.  They also must retain some 
flexibility in the style in which pathologists can produce reports, 
so they can address all matters completely and adequately and so 
that the reports can be useful for public records, for the families 
and loved ones, and as evidence admissible in court.
  They will 
continue to arise as a standard matter when forensic data is 
involved and the analyst or ME is not present for testimony.  
While the courts resolve the uncertainty surrounding how exactly 
to apply Melendez-Diaz, the information contained in these 
reports is simply too important to wait for the next landmark 
decision.  As a result, there are two main question to address: 
(1) should MEs adjust the format by which they report a 
thorough human autopsy—which is generally the last word on 
how someone found his or her end, and (2) should courts adjust 
the approach used when accepting autopsy reports into evidence?  
One or the other must be answered affirmatively, but ideally 
both would. 
215  While 
autopsy reports are not particularly uniform, partly because each 
case has the potential to be very unique, they do generally 
include certain measurements and findings.216  They all also 
contain opinions and conclusory statements, for example the 
cause of death.217
 
214 See, e.g., Pendergrass, 913 N.E.2d at 708. 
  These parts of the report are what families 
look to for a sense of closure and finality; they are also the pieces  
 
 
215 Demanding a restricted format would be akin to handing a judge a law 
student’s brief template and asking her to write all future opinions in that format. 
There is a point at which simplification becomes counterproductive, despite 
perceived efficiency. 
216 See supra Part I.A. 
217 See supra notes 30–34 and accompanying text. 
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that go on the death certificate.218
To resolve this issue, a “lean rule” should be adopted by both 
MEs and the courts.  MEs should adopt a lean format of autopsy 
reporting that they use in all cases;
  At the same time, mistakes in 
those conclusions are riskier as evidence because they can be 
mistaken for fact.  
219 likewise, courts should 
look to accept autopsy reports into evidence in a lean format.220  
This idea of “leanness” would be designed to comply with the 
Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, segregating 
information based on its questionably testimonial or clearly 
nontestimonial characteristics.  The lean portion would contain 
clearly nontestimonial matter, for example a description of the 
procedures used, sizes, weights, measurements, observations of 
items of interest with matching photographs, etc.  The more 
testimonial identification of the deceased—cause of death, 
manner of death, and other similar statements based on opinion 
and conclusion—would be separated out.  An autopsy report 
designed for lean reporting would have, for example, on the left 
hand side of the page, the objective observations and 
measurements; on the right hand side, the opinions and 
conclusions alongside the objective details that triggered those 
diagnoses.  Another example of how to set up a lean report would 
be to have a separate form that covers all nontestimonial matter 
and is attached as an addendum to the full report.221





218 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 but in the unfortunate event that the ME is 
unavailable, the prosecution can easily offer the lean autopsy 
report, stripped of its opinions and conclusions, to be analyzed by 
an expert who can be cross-examined at trial.  This also provides 
219 While there are standards for defining potentially criminal activity, see 
PETERSON & CLARK, supra note 5, at 3–4, adjusting reporting in anticipation that 
the document would be used at trial would throw this immediately within the 
testimonial category of the entire line of cases culminating in Melendez-Diaz. See, 
e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009) (quoting 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004)). 
220 For an example of how this was accomplished successfully, and a rationale 
supporting it, see People v. Freycinet, 11 N.Y.3d 38, 892 N.E.2d 843, 862 N.Y.S.2d 
450 (2008). 
221 These are a couple of examples that illustrate how content could be arranged. 
The mechanics of implementing such a new style of report and its precise format 
ought to be left to the operational experts in the field. 
222 And still useful as a public record! 
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a court with a format that it can easily redact should it run into a 
properly-posed Confrontation Clause challenge.  Some care would 
have to be taken for the report not to slip into a format like the 
core class of testimonial statements, because if it took on an 
affidavit structure or that of a notarized certificate of analysis, it 
would almost certainly run afoul of the Confrontation Clause. 
This lean format creates much greater flexibility for the use 
of autopsy reports in the current legal landscape, while still 
protecting their many important non-legal uses.  It also allows 
MEs to retain all of their substantive responsibilities, without 
sacrificing the potential to use the report should the case be part 
of a trial and the ME is unavailable.  Organizing the report in 
such a way that allows the two sections to be easily separated is 
a minor inconvenience, but can greatly speed the redaction 
process to move the lean portion of the report, that is, the 
nontestimonial observations and measurements, into evidence to 
be analyzed and opined on by an expert.  
Courts can similarly apply the “lean rule” to redact autopsy 
reports that do not conform to the proposed structure.  By 
trimming the questionably testimonial segments from an autopsy 
report, the court can allow the defendant to confront the facts 
that accuse him by calling his own expert to testify as to false or 
objectionable conclusions or flawed process, or by cross-
examining an expert the prosecution calls to discuss the report.223
If we take our hypothetical where the ME performs an 




223 While the defense in Freycinet did not bring its own expert in, it did have the 
opportunity to question the prosecution’s expert who linked the report to the 
defendant. See Freycinet, 11 N.Y.3d at 42, 892 N.E.2d at 846, 862 N.Y.S.2d at 453 
(“[The autopsy] report did not directly link defendant to the crime. The report is 
concerned only with what happened to the victim, not with who killed her.”). 
 and explore the outcomes, 
this seems to be the only logical conclusion.  MEs generally 
testify, so this is a safeguard against their unavailability through 
death, a change of job, or a move.  The additional burden to MEs 
is minor, especially if they structure the lean portion so it is 
simply a part of the larger report.  While the loss of opinion and 
conclusion to the lean portion of the report is noticeable, what 
remains is sufficient to allow both the prosecution and the  
 
 
224 See supra Part II.B. 
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defendant with the opportunity to confront the facts; and the full 
version includes those opinions and conclusions for the benefit of 
the family and public health officials. 
There are many benefits to adopting the “lean rule” into 
practice.  For a task that ought not be replicated, it allows 
experts to analyze the information that the ME gleaned from the 
autopsy in a format that does not excite the rules of evidence.  
Similarly, it allows the evidence and the report to survive the ME 
and allows it to be used particularly in homicide cases—thus 
preventing the formation of an artificial statute of limitations.225  
At the same time, it allows the ME to continue working in a way 
that is relatively unimpeded with only a slight format change to 
the reporting, as compared to a complete gutting of the report or 
absolute inadmissibility, both of which raise fiery policy issues.226
The “lean rule” has its challenges as well.  There still is no 
full-scale confrontation of the individual, because it is impossible.  
At the same time, it does its best to restrict the kinds of things 
that the ME can say from beyond the grave.  Also, because the 
task cannot be replicated, the results might not satisfy Justice 
Scalia. 
 
227  That said, he discarded the ability to verify results as 
irrelevant because confrontation by cross-examination is the only 
constitutionally valid method of testing the reliability of 
evidence, so it may simply be impossible to satisfy him on this 
point.228  Finally, because MEs are on state payroll, Justice Scalia 
expressed the idea that the State, by virtue of paying for services, 
might influence the outcomes of those services, so the specter of 
corruption or an uneven playing field must continue to loom.229
Another important matter to consider is the idea that any 
logical framework that considers the “substantive qualities of 
autopsy reports, such as notions that reports are ‘descriptive’ or 
‘factual,’ render[ing] them not testimonial,” cannot conform with 
   
 
225 See Zabrycki, supra note 177. 
226 Gutting the report would impede the collection of vital statistics and 
inadmissibility would show a lack of trust for a process that is so trusted. 
227 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2535–36 (2009). 
228 See id. at 2536 (“[T]he Constitution guarantees one way [to challenge or 
verify results]: confrontation. We do not have license to suspend the Confrontation 
Clause when a preferable trial strategy is available.”). 
229 Unsurprisingly, and likely because he was discussing analysts and meant to 
exclude autopsy reports, Justic Scalia never explicitly considered that doctors might 
share the same independence as, for example, judges. 
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Crawford.230
In short, the lean format permits the greatest flexibility for 
all parties, and it relieves MEs from the concern that they will 
not be able to testify on a case because of something far beyond 
their control, without imposing a tremendous burden on top of 
their already weighty responsibilities.  While autopsy reports 
should continue to be treated differently from other lab reports 
and survive under the Federal Rules of Evidence, in the event 
that the parade of horribles described by the dissent in Melendez-
Diaz
  As an autopsy report stands currently, if it falls 
down, it falls down on substantive concepts; however, in this 
modified format, it can be reduced to a factual level that is open 
for interpretation, which should survive challenges both from 
Crawford and from Melendez-Diaz. 
231
CONCLUSION 
 begins to march down Main Street, the lean report can 
stand by to turn it away at the courthouse steps. 
Evidentiary rules have provided an avenue for the 
introduction of autopsy reports for many years.  The 
Confrontation Clause challenge raised in Melendez-Diaz, while 
not directly applicable to autopsy reports, has raised the issue 
that they may be testimonial.  Because of the sharp division of 
the Court, and the narrow concurrence in the deciding vote, 
courts should be cautious in their application of Melendez-Diaz.  
Autopsy reports were only mentioned in footnote five but given 
no specific consideration; Justice Thomas concurred on narrow 
grounds and mentioned no document that analogizes with them.  
This dearth of specific reference should give courts pause before 
thrusting autopsy reports into a testimonial and inadmissible 
light in the case of the unavailability of the ME.  It is far more 
preferable and certain to apply Crawford, under which autopsy 
reports have been found to be nontestimonial prior to Melendez-
Diaz, and to carefully measure the analysis performed by the 
Court of Appeals of Michigan in King.  Under Crawford and in 




230 Zabrycki, supra note 177, at 1101. 
231 See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2544 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Its ruling 
has vast potential to disrupt criminal procedures that already give ample protections 
against the misuse of scientific evidence.”). 
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encouraged to call forward experts to draw opinions and 
conclusions from the autopsy reports and to be subject to cross-
examination on those matters. 
The unique nature of autopsy reports and the unique policy 
interests at play for autopsies require unique treatment.  
Autopsies and autopsy reporting are considered public priorities 
for health and safety reasons, and also for social reasons.  One of 
the blessings and the difficulties of an autopsy is that it can only 
be performed once.  Considerations of humanity for both the 
deceased and the survivors are vital to any decision.  Our social 
policies insist that a body must not be yanked around like a piece 
of meat to have the results replicated and confirmed.232  
Similarly, many persons are entitled to an autopsy, paid for by 
the state,233
For these reasons, MEs throughout the United States should 
consider adopting a lean autopsy report structure.  MEs can 
structure their autopsy reports to divide potentially testimonial 
opinions from clearly nontestimonial measurements and 
observations.  By doing so, in the unfortunate case of an ME’s 
demise, the nontestimonial lean portions of the report can be 
admitted into evidence and interpreted by an expert, whom the 
defendant can confront as to the expert’s testimony and opinions.  
Courts can similarly use these guidelines to redact autopsy 
reports in the case that the report was not prepared in such a 
lean format.
 to allow their survivors closure and to allow their 
bodies to be laid to rest without doubt over their passing.  
Autopsies are uniquely important and require unique treatment. 
234
The legal climate surrounding the Confrontation Clause is 
uncertain right now, and Melendez-Diaz has played a large role 
in muddying the waters.  While immediate action may not be the 
most prudent step to take, unless the Court responds in drastic 
  This structure preserves the substantive integrity 
of autopsy reports for their other uses, permits the ME some 
degree of freedom of style, respects the dignity of the deceased, 
and honors the constitutional legacy of the Confrontation Clause.   
 
232 This would also pose a practical difficulty because pieces are gruesomely 
adjusted in the process, so the results of a second autopsy would be colored by the 
process of the first. 
233 This is the case for all of the death scenarios outlined above. See supra note 
14.  
234 For an effective pre-Melendez-Diaz example, see People v. Freycinet, 11 
N.Y.3d 38, 42, 892 N.E.2d 843, 846, 862 N.Y.S.2d 450, 453 (2008). 
CP_Tsiatis (Do Not Delete) 7/14/2011  4:22 PM 
396 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:355   
fashion to confusion over Melendez-Diaz,235
 
235 Despite the recent shifts in the composition of the Court, this seems unlikely 
after the Court’s recent non-ruling in Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010). 
 prosecutors, MEs and 
courts will have to think fast to resolve the difficult challenges 
they might face.  The proposed approach will hopefully contribute 
to the dialogue on this issue and help medicine adapt to today’s 
legal realities, while also helping law understand today’s medical 
realities. 
